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Trade Conference Explores 
U.S.–Mexico ‘Common Bonds’
By Jesus Cañas, Roberto Coronado and Robert W. Gilmer
U.S.–Mexico manufacturing has under-
gone a transformation over the past 10 
years following two U.S. recessions, thrust-
ing Mexico’s maquiladora plants into a new 
age. In his presentation “Maquiladoras: 
Do We Still Benefit from Them?” Federal 
Reserve Bank of Dallas associate economist 
Jesus Cañas compared the effects of the 
2007–09 recession and recovery with the 
2001–02 cycle, when the U.S. entered a mild 
recession accompanied by a steep decline in 
industrial production that quickly spilled into 
Mexico.
In the earlier period, two events ex-
acerbated cyclical challenges confronting 
maquiladoras and contributed to industrial 
restructuring in Mexico. The Sept. 11 terror-
ist attacks bolstered security requirements 
and dramatically slowed border crossings. 
Additionally, China entered the World Trade 
Organization (WTO) in December 2001, gain-
ing access to North American Free Trade 
Agreement markets at tariff rates low enough 
to end Mexico’s low-wage advantage.
By contrast, Cañas said, the 2007–09 
recession was tied primarily to the business 
cycle, with less industrial restructuring and 
labor market displacement through trade.
The structural shift to higher-end manu-
facturing and higher-skilled jobs that occurred 
in the 2001–02 cycle led to a better outcome 
for Mexico and its maquiladoras in the most 
recent recession—and bodes well for U.S.–
Mexico manufacturing in the years to come.
The Maquiladora Redefined 
In 2001–02, Mexico lost 280,500 ma-
quiladora jobs, many in the lowest-wage 
industries, such as toys, leather, textiles and 
apparel. But it became apparent that Mexi-
co’s role in North American production was 
based on more than just low wages, Cañas 
said. Its proximity to the U.S. mattered—for 
bulky items such as appliances and televi-
sions, as well as for just-in-time inventory 
needs. Mexico, with a skilled and experi-
enced workforce and intellectual property 
protections, found its place manufacturing 
higher-value-added goods such as medical 
instruments. 
To evaluate the cycle, it was necessary 
to wait until the recovery to sort cyclical 
losses from longer-lasting structural dam-
age.2 By 2006, maquiladoras had recovered 
fewer than two-thirds of the jobs lost during 
the downturn, and there was no expecta-
tion that the lowest-wage positions would 
return. Yet based on production levels and 
real compensation per worker, the maqui-
ladora industry reached its peak in 2005, 
retaining its most productive and best-com-
pensated positions.
The focus has been on maquiladora 
employment because structural displace-
ment of jobs through trade is an important 
labor market issue and the industry has 
been regarded as a jobs program. As Mex-
ico shifts its competitive focus, however, 
the maquiladora story is increasingly about 
more-skilled jobs and higher compensation, 
not just the number of jobs.
A comparison of employment and real 
compensation shows that the latest cycle 
represents a serious cyclical event, without 
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structural losses, Cañas said.3 The maqui-
ladora industry as a whole experienced a 
jobs decline of 17.4 percent by July 2009, 
deeper than the previous recession. Total 
compensation fell as hard and fast as em-
ployment, suggesting that this time there 
was no bias toward the loss of uncompeti-
tive low-wage jobs (Chart 1).
Employment has returned much faster 
during this recovery, Cañas said. About two-
thirds of the maquiladora job losses were 
restored by late 2010, compared with virtu-
ally no job recovery in U.S. manufacturing.
Examining Integration
Daniel Chiquiar, Banco de México’s 
director of economic measurement, brought 
another point of view to Mexico’s restruc-
turing of manufacturing after 2001, focus-
ing on exports to the U.S. He noted in his 
presentation that the strong historical cycli-
cal correlation between U.S. and Mexican 
manufacturing continued after China’s entry 
into the WTO, and that after 2005, Mexico’s 
share of exports to the U.S. grew again. 
Some reorientation of Mexican manufactur-
ing took place in a short period. 
Chiquiar examined specific industries 
in Mexico to determine if they gained or 
lost competitive advantage after 2001 and 
whether they became more or less inte-
grated into U.S. manufacturing. Integration 
refers to maquiladora-style intra-industry 
trade, with Mexico importing inputs and 
exporting final goods. 
For Mexico, sectors that gain in com-
petitiveness are more integrated into the 
U.S., suggesting that maquiladora-style 
production sharing has been at the heart 
of Mexico’s restructuring. Further, he found 
that improved competitiveness in an indus-
try was often tied to rising skill levels. As 
trade between the two countries evolved 
post-2001, U.S. firms shifted their least-
skilled jobs to Mexico, effectively raising the 
skill level of both Mexican and U.S. manu-
facturing. The primary driver of improved 
competitiveness in Mexico appears to be 
increased skill levels, with no consistent 
role for a shift of physical capital, such as 
plants and equipment.
Carlos Bello, director general of the 
Mexican Federation of the Aerospace In-
dustry, said his sector provides an example 
of how Mexico climbed the ladder in terms 
of manufacturing skills. No other industry 
imposes more exacting requirements for cer-
tification and quality production. 
Mexico had 41 manufacturing plants, 
nine maintenance and repair operations and 
20 design and engineering companies, gen-
erating a combined $3.1 billion in revenue in 
2008, the industry’s peak year. About $13 bil-
lion has been invested in aerospace by for-
eign and national sources. About 5 percent 
of suppliers to major aircraft manufacturers 
such as Boeing, Airbus, Bombardier and Em-
braer are Mexican companies.
For Mexico, sectors that 
gain in competitiveness are 
more integrated into the U.S., 
suggesting that maquiladora-
style production sharing 
has been at the heart of 
Mexico’s restructuring.
Chart 1
Maquiladora Jobs, Wages Rebound from Recession
(Real wages, seasonally adjusted)
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Auto Parts and Assembly
George Magliano, director of North 
American automotive research at Global 
Insight, and several other experts discussed 
the changing landscape of North American 
auto production. Auto parts and assembly is 
a large and important example of Mexico’s 
maquiladora trade. Mexico now vies with 
Canada to be the second-largest auto pro-
ducer in North America (Chart 2).
Mexico passed Canada in 2009 to be-
come the largest exporter of auto parts to 
the U.S., with a 30 percent share of U.S. im-
ports (Chart 3). China has made inroads as 
a parts supplier to the U.S. in recent years, 
largely at the expense of Canada. 
Magliano presented his analysis of the 
auto industry in the context of recession, 
recovery and longer-term growth. He said 
a slow U.S. recovery will carry over to the 
auto market in a number of ways. A weak 
job environment, lack of creditworthiness 
and a poor housing market could keep 
sales below prerecession levels until 2015. 
Relative to population or employment, 2015 
sales will remain much lower than before 
Mexico passed Canada in 
2009 to become the largest 
exporter of auto parts to the 
U.S., with a 30 percent share of 
U.S. imports. China has made 
inroads as a parts supplier to 
the U.S. in recent years, largely 
at the expense of Canada.
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the downturn, with no recovery expected 
in these ratios. Magliano said, however, that 
the postrecession, restructured auto indus-
try is profitable—and that will only improve 
as sales volumes return.
North American production has 
snapped back quickly from the depths of 
the recession. Ralph Watkins, International 
Trade Commission senior international 
trade analyst, tracked the most important 
sectors in the turnaround in U.S.–Mexico 
trade and found intra-industry trade in 
autos at the forefront. High on the list of 
fast-growing U.S. exports to Mexico in 2010 
were engines, auto parts, cars, trucks and 
engine parts. Fast-growing Mexican imports 
from the U.S. included those items, along 
with seat parts and truck-tractors.
Over the long run, Magliano said, 
North American vehicle production will 
return to about 16 million units, the level 
before the recession began. He reiterated 
that Mexico already has been a big winner 
in the North American auto market, and 
Mexican plants will continue adding capac-
ity as it’s shut down in the U.S. and Canada. 
The 2 million light vehicles currently pro-
duced in Mexico should surge to 3.3 million 
units by 2015. Ford, GM and Chrysler have 
shifted premium production to Mexico, 
manufacturing large and expensive, high-
valued-added vehicles such as bigger pick-
up trucks and SUVs. 
Thomas Klier, a senior economist at 
the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, put 
Mexico’s niche in the North American auto 
market into perspective. In his address on 
U.S.–Mexico auto linkages, he said that 
Mexico is not well-integrated into the U.S.–
Canada Auto Alley, a region centered in De-
troit and stretching from the Great Lakes to 
Tennessee and Mississippi. But Mexico has 
a cost advantage; it offers the lowest wages 
in North America. Klier said this advantage 
can be found in such labor-intensive activi-
ties as casting, machining and painting.
These auto-related skills are more 
than a notch above the low-wage assembly 
and sewing skills associated with the early 
maquiladoras. However, Thomas Kurfess, 
a professor at Clemson University’s Inter-
national Center for Automotive Research, 
emphasized that the auto industry is in-
creasingly driven by system integration, led 
by advanced electronics. He pointed to the 
critical role of research and development, 
noting that little of it occurs in Mexico. 
Some design and development takes place 
at the component level—many suppli-
ers moved into Mexican industrial parks 
because of just-in-time inventory require-
ments—but nothing original is happening 
in engineering for assembly operations. 
Exploiting Its Advantages
Mexico lost many of its low-wage, 
low-skill jobs in the apparel and textile in-
dustry following the 2001–02 recession. In 
the early 2000s, low-wage competition in 
Asia, Central America and the Caribbean led 
to structural job losses in low-value-added 
sectors of Mexican manufacturing. New av-
enues for growth arose later in the decade, 
however, as U.S. and foreign car companies 
increasingly sought cost savings by turning 
to Mexican parts suppliers and assembly 
plants. Mexico’s proximity to the U.S., its ex-
perienced manufacturing workforce and its 
lower cost structure led to a growing role in 
North American auto parts production and 
auto assembly and contributed significantly 
to the global competitiveness of the North 
American auto industry.
Cañas is an associate economist at the Federal 
Reserve Bank of Dallas, and Coronado is an econ-
omist in the Bank’s El Paso Branch. Gilmer is vice 
president in charge of the El Paso Branch.
Notes
1 See the conference agenda at www.dallasfed.org/news/
research/2010/10commonbonds.cfm.
2 “Maquiladora Recovery: Lessons for the Future,” by Jesus 
Cañas, Roberto Coronado, Robert W. Gilmer, Southwest 
Economy, no. 2, 2007.
3 Mexico revised its coverage of export-oriented plants for data 
collection purposes in 2007 to include maquiladoras, plus 
domestic plants that enjoy similar tax and customs benefits. 
Thus, the data coverage in the 2007–09 chart is broader 
than prior figures, which were strictly for the foreign-owned 
maquiladoras. See “Mexican Reform Clouds View of Key 
Industry,” by Jesus Cañas and Robert W. Gilmer, Southwest 
Economy, no. 3, 2007. 
Other Trade Topics
Conference speakers addressed other issues related to U.S.–Mexico trade. Those presenters included 
Andrew Selee, director of the Mexico Institute at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars; 
vice president and senior policy advisor Evan Koenig, vice president and senior economist Mark Wynne 
and economist Roberto Coronado, all of the Dallas Fed; and Vanda Felbab-Brown, a fellow at the Brook-
ings Institution.
• Selee suggested four strategic initiatives to advance the needs of the U.S.–Mexico border: timely 
and efficient movement of goods across the border; expansion of the North American Development 
Bank into new and creative projects; border educational partnerships to train binational leaders; and 
the pursuit of green energy and health care opportunities unique to the region.1
• Koenig forecast a continued moderate pace of recovery in the U.S. but “a long slog” before the na-
tion returns to the levels of employment and income indicated by the trend before the financial crisis.
• Wynne said initial fears of deglobalization—a reversal of global integration—resulting from the 
2007–08 collapse in world trade are unwarranted. In retrospect, most of the decline is accounted 
for by the severity of the crisis and the highly cyclical durable-goods sector’s share of world trade. 
• Coronado discussed how maquiladora growth affects jobs in El Paso and other border cities. For 
the border as a whole, the impact of the maquiladora is reduced from levels of 20 years ago, but 
it remains a particularly strong influence in Texas border cities. The impact no longer extends to 
manufacturing on the U.S. side of the border but is more evident in services such as transportation, 
real estate, and wholesale and retail trade, he said.
• Felbab-Brown brought into perspective the current drug-related violence in northern Mexico. So 
far, the large industrial plants of northern Mexico have not been targets of this criminal activity, 
although plant management has been placed at risk of extortion and kidnapping and employees live 
in fear. The violence continues as a significant threat to economic and social progress throughout 
northern Mexico. 
NOTE:
1 See “Strategic Guidelines for the Competitive and Sustainable Development of the U.S.–Mexico Transborder Region,” 
presentation by El Colegio de la Frontera Norte and the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Border Governors 
Conference, September 2009.